Document 16163201

Case 1:20-cv-00330-PAE Document 1616320 Filed 02/24/22 Page 25 of 117 A-5840 Westlaw Page 1 80 A.3d 168, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 09090 (Cite as: 80 A.3d 168, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187) H Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. In the Matter of Catherine M. CONRAD, a suspended attorney: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Catherine M. Conrad, Respondent. Dec. 9, 2010. Background: Departmental Disciplinary Committee instituted disciplinary proceedings against attorney. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 48 A.D.3d 187, 846 N.Y.S.2d 912, suspended attorney from practice of law for failure to respond to requests made by Committee pursuant to its investigations of complaints made against her. Committee subsequently moved for order suspending attorney on ground that she suffered from disability by reason of physical or mental infirmity or illness. Attorney cross-moved for order converting her current suspension to medical suspension nunc pro tunc and order vacating suspension and reinstating her to practice of law. Holdings: The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: (1) attorney's immediate reinstatement was not warranted, and (2) attorney was required to prove her fitness to be reinstated. Suspension ordered. West Headnotes [1] Attorney and Client 45 45I The Office of Attorney 451(C) Discipline 45k61 k. Reinstatement. Most Cited Cases Immediate reinstatement of suspended attorney to practice of law was not warranted; alcohol dependence rendered attorney unfit to practice law, and attorney acknowledged during her deposition that her failure to cooperate and her underlying conduct was related to alcohol dependency. N.Y.Ct.Rules, §§ 603.16(c)(1), (f). [2] Attorney and Client 45 45I The Office of Attorney 451(C) Discipline 45k61 k. Reinstatement. Most Cited Cases Attorney who was suspended from practice of law due to her alcohol dependence was required to prove her fitness to be reinstated, and that burden could not be satisfied by attorney's own self-assessment; rather, evaluation by © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. PMD 20 DOJ-OGR-00009444 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00338-PAE Document 16163201 Filed 02/24/22 Page 78 of 117 A-5916 14 CAC3PARC 1 myself the other night, if somebody had said to me, and again I 2 apologize for the example, I won't try to belabor it. But 3 December 28 in year one if I gave 10,000 shares of IBM to a 4 charity and 10,000 shares to my daughter, right, and I said to 5 my broker just move them into those -- 10,000 to charity, 6 10,000 to my daughter. And the broker made a mistake. And 7 here's what makes it so tricky. The shares to the charity were 8 IBM; the shares to my daughter were Philip Morris. They 9 reversed it. The charity calls January 2nd and says we can't 10 take tobacco stock. We can't accept your gift. I call the 11 broker, I say what about this. He says we'll just reverse it. 12 It was our mistake. We'll send the Philip Morris to your 13 daughter and we'll send the IBM to the charity. And they 14 reverse it and they put as of December 28 because they reverse 15 it and do it at December 28 prices and it all shows up on the 16 January statement. 17 If I said to Mr. Parse, if I said to me -- the Court 18 may be situated differently, the Court's been educated by this 19 trial. If I said can I put that tax deduction on my year one 20 return, in that situation, even though it was mistake, it never 21 got accepted, I'd say I don't know, you should ask a tax 22 lawyer. And that's what Mr. Parse said. He made the 23 transactions, he made the change, not a single document at 24 Deutsche Bank reflected that this happened other than the as of 25 which was a reflection of what the pricing was. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 DOJ-OGR-00009492