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The government bears a dual burden in seeking pre-trial detention. First, the government must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . presents an actual risk of flight." Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75 (emphasis added). If the government is able to satisfy this burden, it must then "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court." Id.
In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
In this case, unlike in the Epstein case, the government does not contend that Ms. Maxwell poses any danger to the community, and therefore the fourth factor does not apply.
The Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption, applicable based on certain of the crimes charged here, that no conditions will reasonably assure against flight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In cases where this presumption applies, the "defendant bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that [she] does not pose . . . a risk of flight." See United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). This rebuttable presumption can be readily satisfied, United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756 MAG (DMR), 2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), and "[a]ny evidence favorable to a defendant that comes within a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation" of the presumption. United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Mattis, No. 20-1713,
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Full Text
Case 20-0336 Document 18 Filed 07/10/20 Page 10 of 20
The government bears a dual burden in seeking pre-trial detention. First, the government must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . presents an actual risk of flight." Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75 (emphasis added). If the government is able to satisfy this burden, it must then "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court." Id.
In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
In this case, unlike in the Epstein case, the government does not contend that Ms. Maxwell poses any danger to the community, and therefore the fourth factor does not apply.
The Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption, applicable based on certain of the crimes charged here, that no conditions will reasonably assure against flight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In cases where this presumption applies, the "defendant bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that [she] does not pose . . . a risk of flight." See United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). This rebuttable presumption can be readily satisfied, United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756 MAG (DMR), 2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), and "[a]ny evidence favorable to a defendant that comes within a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation" of the presumption. United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Mattis, No. 20-1713,
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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 18 Filed 07/10/20 Page 11 of 20
2020 WL 3536277, at *4–5 (2d Cir. June 30, 2020). Although the presumption “remains a factor to be considered” even after the defendant has met her burden of production, “[a]t all times . . . the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by . . . a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant poses a flight risk that cannot be addressed by any bail conditions. English, 629 F.3d at 319 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Deutsch, No. 18-CR-502 (FB), 2020 WL 3577398, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2020). And regardless of the presence of the presumption or the nature of the charges alleged, “[n]othing in this section [3142] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j); see also United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (those charged with crimes involving minors “continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence in setting conditions of release.”).
B. Ms. Maxwell Has Rebutted the Presumption That She Poses a Flight Risk, and the Government Has Not Carried Its Burden That No Combination of Conditions Can Be Imposed To Reasonably Assure Her Presence In Court
The government has not carried its burden of establishing that no set of conditions will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell’s appearance in court. As set forth below, Ms. Maxwell’s personal history, her family and other ties to this country, and her conduct prior to her arrest easily rebut the presumption that she presents a risk of flight. For these same reasons, the government cannot establish that the strict bail conditions she proposes, which are consistent with a number of cases in this Circuit in which courts have ordered release, will not “reasonably assure” her presence in court. Accordingly, the Court should order Ms. Maxwell released pursuant to her proposed conditions.
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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 18 Filed 07/10/20 Page 11 of 20
2020 WL 3536277, at *4–5 (2d Cir. June 30, 2020). Although the presumption “remains a factor to be considered” even after the defendant has met her burden of production, “[a]t all times . . . the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by . . . a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant poses a flight risk that cannot be addressed by any bail conditions. English, 629 F.3d at 319 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Deutsch, No. 18-CR-502 (FB), 2020 WL 3577398, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2020). And regardless of the presence of the presumption or the nature of the charges alleged, “[n]othing in this section [3142] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j); see also United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (those charged with crimes involving minors “continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence in setting conditions of release.”).
B. Ms. Maxwell Has Rebutted the Presumption That She Poses a Flight Risk, and the Government Has Not Carried Its Burden That No Combination of Conditions Can Be Imposed To Reasonably Assure Her Presence In Court
The government has not carried its burden of establishing that no set of conditions will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell’s appearance in court. As set forth below, Ms. Maxwell’s personal history, her family and other ties to this country, and her conduct prior to her arrest easily rebut the presumption that she presents a risk of flight. For these same reasons, the government cannot establish that the strict bail conditions she proposes, which are consistent with a number of cases in this Circuit in which courts have ordered release, will not “reasonably assure” her presence in court. Accordingly, the Court should order Ms. Maxwell released pursuant to her proposed conditions.
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