Document 22-1426, Document 78

Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page101 of 217 SA-355 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 7 of 21 deliberations." Maxwell Reply Br. at 8. This argument is wrong, as "the ultimate purpose of the [requested] post-trial evidentiary hearing is to set aside a jury verdict." Ventura, 2014 WL 259655, at *3. And "there is no discernible reason to apply a different general standard to new trial motions based on juror misconduct than to those premised on any other reason." United States v. Guzman Loera, No. 09-CR-0466 (BMC), 2019 WL 2869081, at *5 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2019), aff'd, 24 F.4th 144 (2d Cir. 2022). "[E]ven though there are additional considerations . . . when ruling on an evidentiary hearing and new trial motion premised upon allegations of juror misconduct, these are the overarching legal standards applicable to all Rule 33 motions, including when juror misconduct is at issue." Id. If a hearing is held, "its scope should be limited to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision." Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544. "Therefore, in the course of a post-verdict inquiry . . ., when and if it becomes apparent that the above-described reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety do not exist, the inquiry should end." Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. The Court has discretion to structure the hearing and to determine what testimony is needed. Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544. B. The scope of the hearing The Court will conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Juror 50 provided false answers on the questionnaire, the explanation for those answers, and how Juror 50 would have responded to follow-up questions if accurate answers had been provided. The Government acknowledges that Juror 50's answer to Question 48 satisfies the demanding standard for an evidentiary hearing under McDonough. Gov. Br. at 33. The Court agrees. Question 48 asked jurors: Have you or a friend or family member ever been the victim of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual assault? (This includes actual or attempted 7 DOJ-OGR-00021531 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page102 of 217 SA-356 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 8 of 21 sexual assault or other unwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger, acquaintance, supervisor, teacher, or family member.) Dkt. No. 462 at 24. In response to that question, Juror 50 checked the box for "No," not the box for either "Yes (self)" or "Yes (friend or family member)." But in several public statements made to media outlets after the trial, including interviews in The Independent and The Daily Mail dated January 5, 2022, Juror 50 stated that he was sexually abused as a minor. The statements are direct, unambiguous, and made by Juror 50 himself to multiple media outlets. Moreover, the statements themselves describe Juror 50's own experience.4 They constitute "clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred," and so warrant an evidentiary hearing. Baker, 99 F.3d at 130. Although the Court does not decide whether the threshold to hold a hearing based on Question 25 alone has been met, because the Court will hold a hearing on Juror 50's answer to Question 48 and because Question 48 and 25 are sufficiently related, the Court will inquire into Juror 50's answer to Question 25. Question 25 asked jurors: Have you, or any of your relatives or close friends, ever been a victim of a crime? Dkt. No. 462 at 13. Again, Juror 50 checked the box for "No," and not the box for either "Yes (self)" or "Yes (friend or family member)." But Juror 50's post-trial statements, if true, may describe criminal conduct of which he was the victim. Therefore, Juror 50's answer to Question 25 is sufficiently related to the answer to Question 48 and so the Court will also inquire as to Question 25 at an evidentiary hearing. See Baker, 99 F.3d at 130. 4 The articles additionally state that Juror 50 shared this experience with the jury during deliberations. The Court is prohibited by Rule 606 from considering that Juror 50 also told this information to the jury. That Juror 50 revealed that he also disclosed this information to the jury does not prohibit the Court from considering Juror 50's independent statements made to a reporter about his own experience. 8 DOJ-OGR-00021532 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page9 of 217 SA-263 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 263 of 348 no federal charges filed against Epstein as a result of the government's agreement in mid-2007 to defer prosecution to the state.370 C. July 2008: Villafaña Prepares and Sends a Victim Notification Letter to Listed Victims On July 8, 2008, Villafaña provided Goldberger with an updated victim list for 18 U.S.C. § 2255 purposes, noting that she had inadvertently left off one individual in her June 30, 2008 letter. Villafaña also informed the defense that, beginning the following day, she would distribute notifications to each of the 32 victims and their counsel informing them that Epstein's attorney would be the contact for any civil litigation, if the victim decided to pursue damages. Finally, the letter informed the defense that the government would consider a denial by Epstein that any "one of these victims is entitled to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 2255" to be considered a breach of the terms of the NPA. After exchanging emails and letters with the defense concerning the content of the notice letter, Villafaña drafted a letter she sent, on July 9 and 10, to nine victims who had previously retained counsel. The letter informed the victims and their counsel that, "[i]n light of" Epstein's June 30, 2008 state court plea to felony solicitation of prostitution and procurement of minors to engage in prostitution, and his sentence of a total of 18 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' community control, "the United States has agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of this state plea and sentence, subject to certain conditions." The letter included a reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 2255 provision of the NPA, and although the defense had never agreed to it, used language from Acosta's December 19, 2007 letter to Epstein defense attorney Sanchez clarifying the damages provision. The paragraph below was described as "[o]ne such condition to which Epstein has agreed": Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an offense enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, will have the same rights to proceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and convicted of an enumerated offense. For purposes of implementing this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. Epstein's attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared to name . . . as victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein. Any judicial authority interpreting this provision, including any authority determining which evidentiary burdens if any a plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the parties to place these identified victims in the same position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial. No more; no less. On July 10, 2008, Villafaña sent Goldberger a "Final Notification of Identified Victims," highlighting the defendant's obligations under the NPA concerning victim lawsuits pursuant to 370 As described in Section XII.G of this Part, the matter continued in litigation for years and resulted in the district court's February 21, 2019 opinion concluding that the government violated the victims' rights under the CVRA by failing to consult with them before signing the NPA. 237 DOJ-OGR-00021439 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page103 of 217 SA-357 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 9 of 21 The potential impropriety that warrants a hearing is not that someone with a history of sexual abuse may have served on the jury. Rather, it is Juror 50's potential failure to respond truthfully to questions during the jury selection process that asked for such material information so that any potential bias could be explored. Accordingly, the Court will hold a hearing limited in scope to Juror 50's answers to Questions 25 and 48 of the questionnaire. C. The Defendant has not justified an inquiry into Juror 50's social media The parties devote significant portions of the briefs to the question of whether Juror 50 answered falsely the Court's questions about social media usage during voir dire. To the extent that the Defendant seeks a hearing to probe Juror 50's answers to voir dire about his social media usage, her arguments are based on speculation, and she has failed to make the high showing required. See Baker, 899 F.3d at 130. At voir dire, when asked if he "use[s] social media," Juror 50 stated, "I do, but I actually just deleted them because I just got out of a relationship and I didn't want to see anything regarding them. So I am fully off of it right now." Nov. 16, 2021 Tr. at 133. The Court then asked, "What did you use, Facebook, Twitter?" to which Juror 50 replied "Facebook and Instagram," clarifying that the accounts contained "[p]ersonal stuff, like selfies." Id. The screenshots proffered by the Defendant do not demonstrate that any of these answers implicate McDonough. First, Juror 50 did not deny having a Twitter account. Second, Juror 50's account had only 1 follower and followed only 39 people, which corroborates that his Twitter use was, at most, relatively minimal. See Maxwell Br. at 17. Third, the fact that Juror 50's Twitter account was opened in April 2021 and that he used it again in January 2022, after the completion of the trial, is consistent with Juror 50's answer that he deleted his social media accounts, or just the social media applications, shortly before voir dire. The same is true of Juror 9 DOJ-OGR-00021533 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page106 of 217 SA-360 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 12 of 21 insufficient basis for an evidentiary hearing, especially one that, according to the Defendant, would require the Court to "haul [11] jurors in after they have reached a verdict" to probe for who, if anyone, may have been mentioned in the article. Guzman Loera, 24 F.4th at 161 (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234). Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 606 bars the Court from considering Juror 50's statements as evidence of another juror's statements purportedly made during deliberations. As previously quoted, the rule states: During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). Rule 606(b) is subject to three enumerated exceptions that permit a juror to testify about whether (A) "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention"; (B) "an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror"; or (C) "a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form." Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). In addition to these exceptions enumerated in the rule, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 606 "give[s] way" where "a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant." Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017). Absent one of these circumstances, evidence within the ambit of Rule 606 may not be considered. Here, the Defendant relies on Juror 50's statements of what another juror allegedly stated during deliberations. That proffer is barred by Rule 606. In response, the Defendant argues that Juror 50's statements about the second juror fall outside the scope of Rule 606 because she "does not seek to impeach the verdict based on the 12 DOJ-OGR-00021536 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page13 of 217 SA-267 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 267 of 348 F. 2010 - 2011: Department and Congressional Actions Regarding Interpretation of the CVRA In connection with the Department's 2010 effort to update its 2005 Guidelines, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General convened a Victim of Crimes Working Group that asked OLC to revisit its 2005 preliminary review concerning the definition of "crime victim" under the CVRA and solicited input concerning the issue from Department components and federal law enforcement agencies. In response, OLC issued a December 17, 2010 opinion entitled, The Availability of Crime Victims' Rights Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004. Based on the CVRA's language, relevant case law, and memoranda opinions from Department components, OLC reaffirmed its 2005 conclusion that CVRA rights do not vest until a criminal charge has been filed (by complaint, information, or indictment) and the rights cease to be available if "all charges are dismissed either voluntarily or on the merits (or if the [g]overnment declines to bring formal charges after the filing of a complaint)."378 After OLC issued its opinion, the Department revised the 2005 Guidelines in October 2011 but did not change its fundamental position that the CVRA rights did not vest until after criminal charges were filed. The 2011 revision did, however, add language concerning victim consultation before a defendant is charged: "In circumstances where plea negotiations occur before a case has been brought, Department policy is that this should include reasonable consultation prior to the filing of a charging instrument with the court."379 The use of the word "should" in the 2011 Guidelines indicates that "personnel are expected to take the action . . . unless there is an appropriate, articulable reason not to do so."380 Nevertheless, the required consultation "may be general in nature" and "does not have to be specific to a particular plea offer."381 The revisions also specified that AUSAs were to ensure that victims had a right to be reasonably heard at plea proceedings.382 On November 2, 2011, U.S. Senator Jon Kyl, a co-sponsor of the CVRA, sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, arguing that the 2011 Guidelines revisions "conflict[ed] quite clearly with the CVRA's plain language" because the 2011 Guidelines did "not extend any rights to victims until charges have been filed." The Department's response emphasized that the 378 OLC "express[ed] no opinion" as to whether it is a matter of "good practice" to inform victims of their CVRA rights prior to the filing of a complaint or after the dismissal of charges. 379 See 2011 Guidelines, Art. V, ¶ G.2, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/ag_guidelines2012.pdf. In its 2011 online training video regarding the Guidelines, the Department encouraged such consultation when reasonable, but it also continued to maintain that there was no CVRA right to confer for pre-indictment plea negotiations. 380 See 2011 Guidelines, Art. I, ¶ B.2. 381 See 2011 Guidelines, Art. V, ¶ G.2. 382 The 2005 Guidelines contained no specific provision requiring AUSAs to ensure that victims were able to exercise their right to be reasonably heard at plea proceedings, only at sentencing. See 2005 Guidelines, Art. IV, ¶ C.3.b.(2). However, the 2005 Guidelines generally require AUSAs to use their best efforts to comply with the CVRA, and the CVRA specifically affords victims the right to be heard at plea proceedings. The 2011 revision remedied this omission. 241 DOJ-OGR-00021443 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page111 of 217 SA-365 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 17 of 21 public hearing with input from counsel. The parties may submit questions consistent with this ruling, including what the Court holds in this Opinion are the limitations imposed by Rule 606 and the appropriate scope of the hearing. Once again, the scope of the inquiry is whether Juror 50's answers were false; if so, what is the explanation for the answers; and how Juror 50 would have responded to follow-up questions if accurate answers had been provided. Per this Court's prior order, the parties must submit the proposed questions under temporary seal to ensure the integrity of the inquiry. See Dkt. No. 596 at 4. Proposed questions must be submitted via email on or before March 1, 2022. The proposed questions will be unsealed following the hearing. B. The Defendant's subpoena requests are denied The Defendant seeks two sets of subpoenas to conduct discovery in advance of the hearing. Maxwell Br. at 48-49. First, from Juror 50, the Defendant seeks any emails or other communications between Juror 50 and any alleged victim or witness; any other juror; any other person or media organization about Juror 50's jury service; and, finally, any record of payments for any interview or information that Juror 50 gave about his jury service. Second, from Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and other social media platforms, the Defendant seeks all communications to and from Juror 50 regarding his jury service; all posts, comments, or photographs by Juror 50 regarding his jury service; and all documents reflecting when Juror 50 opened or closed his accounts. In her initial brief, the Defendant simply lists these requests without justification. In her reply, she provides only a short rebuttal to the Government's objections and does not explain why each request is relevant or proper. The Court denies these requests as vexatious, intrusive, unjustified, and a fishing expedition. Given the focused inquiry the Court is ordering, the evidentiary hearing's scope 17 DOJ-OGR-00021541 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page112 of 217 SA-366 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 18 of 21 must be "limited to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision." Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544. The Defendant can only speculate that the requested communications between Juror 50 and unknown persons and entities would shed any light on Juror 50's answers to the questionnaire and his bias before the trial at the time of voir dire. Nor has the Defendant explained why Juror 50's receipt of financial payment for interviews after the trial, if true, would be probative of his inclination to not disclose at voir dire prior to trial. The Court will not grant the Defendant "the opportunity to 'conduct a fishing expedition.'" Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234 (quoting Moten, 582 F.2d at 667). Moreover, the Defendant's requested subpoenas directed at social media companies who have custody of Juror 50's communications, comments, and posts are procedurally improper. Those requests for social media content are subject to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11, which requires an additional factual showing for the Court to order disclosure, see 2 Wayne LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §§ 4.8(b), 4.8(d) (4th ed. 2021); Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Acct. Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). And only the Government, not private parties like the Defendant, may request disclosure pursuant to the Act. United States v. Nix, 251 F. Supp. 3d 555, 559 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) ("[T]he [SCA] does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to subpoena the content of a Facebook or Instagram account."); Facebook, Inc. v. Wint, 199 A.3d 625, 629 (D.C. 2019) (collecting cases). Though the Government raised the Act in its briefing, the Defendant does not acknowledge it or purport to show she is entitled to make a request. Accordingly, the requests as to the listed social media companies are denied. 18 DOJ-OGR-00021542 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page60 of 217 SA-314 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 314 of 348 Attorney's Offices was migrated to EOUSA's centralized system to be maintained. The USAO's data was migrated between March and June 2008. EOUSA and OPR separately confirmed with the USAO that it was unable to locate any additional emails. OPR questioned Acosta, as well as numerous administrative staff, about the email gap. Acosta and the witnesses denied having any knowledge of the problem, or that they or, to their knowledge, anyone else made any efforts to intentionally delete the emails. In addition, at OPR's request, EOUSA conducted an analysis of records migrated from four other U.S. Attorney's Offices and found that each office provided data that also contained significant gaps in their U.S. Attorney email records, although the time periods varied for each office. OPR found no evidence indicating that the gap in Acosta's emails was caused by any intentional act or for the purpose of concealing evidence relating to the Epstein investigation and concludes that it was most likely the result of a technological terror. Although a gap in Acosta's email inbox from May 26, 2007, through April 2, 2008, remained, OPR was nonetheless able to examine a significant number of Acosta's emails from this time due to the extensive case files kept by the USAO; the availability of Acosta's sent email, which did not contain a similar gap; and the availability of emails of other USAO subjects and witnesses who were included on emails with Acosta. 3. Federal Bureau of Investigation Records OPR worked with the FBI's Palm Beach Office, including with two case agents and the Victim Witness Specialist who worked on the Epstein matter, to obtain relevant FBI documents. In addition, the FBI searched its Automated Case Support system and also provided documentation concerning its victim notification system. 4. Criminal Division Records The Office of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division provided OPR with Outlook data for the four individuals from that Office who examined issues connected to the USAO's Epstein investigation. The data included the individuals' inbox, outbox, sent, deleted, and saved emails, and calendar entries. CEOS also provided OPR with Outlook data for the four individuals from that office who worked on, or examined issues connected to, the USAO's Epstein investigation. The data included the individuals' inbox, outbox, sent, deleted, and saved emails. CEOS also conducted a check of its shared hard drive and provided documents that were potentially relevant to OPR's investigation. 5. Office of the Deputy Attorney General Records OPR obtained Outlook data for the three individuals from the Office of the Deputy Attorney who examined issues connected to the USAO's Epstein investigation, including the former Deputy Attorney General. The data included the individuals' inbox, outbox, sent, deleted, and saved emails, and calendar entries. 288 DOJ-OGR-00021490 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page65 of 217 SA-319 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 319 of 348 INDICTMENT A TRUE BILL 06- 9454CF IN THE NAME OF AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA For Palm Beach County, at the Spring Term thereof, in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Six, to-wit: The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their oaths do present that JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN in the County of Palm Beach aforesaid, in the Circuit and State aforesaid, COUNT ONE FELONY SOLICITATION OF PROSTITUTION on or about or between the 1st day of August in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Four and October 31, 2005, did solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to commit prostitution lewdness, or assignation, contrary to Florida Statute 796.07(1) on three or more occasions between August 01, 2004 and October 31, 2005, contrary to Florida Statute 796.07(2)(f) and (4)(c). (3 DEG FEL)(LEVEL 1) against the form of the statute, to the evil example of all others, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. I hereby certify that I have advised the Grand Jury returning this indictment as authorized and required by law. STATE OF FLORIDA I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the record in my office. BERNARD B BOCK DEPUTY CLERK July 19, 2006 DATE Assistant State Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, prosecuting for the said State Will H. Wallace GRAND JURY FOREPERSON Jeffrey E. Epstein, Race: White, Sex: Male, DOB: [redacted] SS#: [redacted] Issue Warrant DOJ-OGR-00021495 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page80 of 217 SA-334 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 334 of 348 By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is material to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach of any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement and to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other individual or entity for any and all federal offenses. By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that he is aware of the fact that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Epstein further is aware that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint for unnecessary delay in presenting a charge to the Grand Jury, filing an information, or in bringing a defendant to trial. Epstein hereby requests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such prosecution. Epstein agrees and consents that any delay from the date of this Agreement to the date of initiation of prosecution, as provided for in the terms expressed herein, shall be deemed to be a necessary delay at his own request, and he hereby waives any defense to such prosecution on the ground that such delay operated to deny him rights under Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to a speedy trial or to bar the prosecution by reason of the statute of limitations for a period of months equal to the period between the signing of this agreement and the breach of this agreement as to those offenses that were the subject of the grand jury's investigation. Epstein further asserts and certifies that he understands that the Fifth Amendment and Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that all felonies must be charged in an indictment presented to a grand jury. Epstein hereby agrees and consents that, if a prosecution against him is instituted for any offense that was the subject of the grand jury's investigation, it may be by way of an Information signed and filed by the United States Attorney, and hereby waives his right to be indicted by a grand jury as to any such offense. /// /// /// Page 6 of 7 DOJ-OGR-00021510 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page81 of 217 SA-335 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 335 of 348 By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Dated: By: Dated: 9/24/07 By: JEFFREY EPSTEIN Dated: By: GERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN Dated: By: LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Page 7 of 7 DOJ-OGR-00021511 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page82 of 217 SA-336 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 336 of 348 By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY By: A. MARIE VILLAFANA ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY Dated: 9/27/07 Dated: Dated: 9/24/07 Dated: JEFFREY EPSTEIN GERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Page 7 of 7 DOJ-OGR-00021512 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 22-1426, Document 78, 06/29/2023, 3536039, Page22 of 217 SA-276 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 276 of 348 service providers, and lists the names and telephone numbers of the victim-witness coordinator or specialist and other key officials. A victim must be informed of— (a) His or her rights as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). (b) His or her right entitlement, on request, to the services listed in 42 U.S.C. § 10607(c). (c) The name, title, business address, and telephone number of the responsible official to whom such a request for services should be addressed. (d) The place where the victim may receive emergency medical or social services. (e) The availability of any restitution or other relief (including crime victim compensation programs) to which the victim may be entitled under this or any other applicable law and the manner in which such relief may be obtained. (f) Public and private programs that are available to provide counseling, treatment, and other support to the victim. … (i) The availability of services for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. (j) The option of being included in VNS. (k) Available protections from intimidation and harassment. … (3) Notice during the investigation. During the investigation of a crime, a responsible official shall provide the victim with the earliest possible notice concerning— (a) The status of the investigation of the crime, to the extent that it is appropriate and will not interfere with the investigation. (b) The arrest of a suspected offender. B. Prosecution Stage The prosecution stage begins when charges are filed and continues through postsentencing legal proceedings, including appeals and collateral attacks. 250 DOJ-OGR-00021452