Document 69

Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 69 Filed 08/04/25 Page 1 of 2 MEMO ENDORSED August 4, 2025 Page 1 VIA EMAIL TO JUDGE BERMAN: Hon. Richard M. Berman, U.S.D.J. United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007-1312 Re: United States of America vs. Jeffrey Epstein, 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Dear Hon. Judge Berman: I come forward to you today in disdain, disgust and fear of how the United States of America's DOJ has handled the promise to release the "Epstein Files". Out of respect for the court, I will keep this short, to the point and as direct as possible. It has been a very difficult time for me personally, mentally and emotionally dealing with the circus around the "Epstein Files". I use quotations because what are these "Files" exactly, anyway?" I regrettably feel the need to come forward and shed some light on the Government's motion to unseal transcripts, documents and exhibits from the "case" that was never tried. Sad to say, for the victims we never got our day in court. Apparently, Epstein killed himself under whose watch? Oh, was it Trump's DOJ? Hmmm, interesting. Although, I am for complete and utter transparency in this case, we deserve transparency from our own government, the agencies that were supposed to be there to protect us victims and guess what, they utterly and completely failed us. Unfortunately, with their disregard for the victims I feel it is imperative to write this letter to the court. Because, I personally desire to remain anonymous I feel like I do not have a voice. Therefore, with it being my right to have an opinion as a victim in this matter I have a voice to speak to the court and to the United States. Dear United States, I wish you would have handled and would handle the whole "Epstein Files" with more respect towards and for the victims. I am not some pawn in your political warfare. What you have done and continue to do is eating at me day after day as you help to perpetuate this story indefinitely. Why not be completely transparent? Show us all the files with only the necessary redactions! Be done with it and allow me/us to heal. You protect yourself and your powerful and wealthy "friends" (not enemies) over the victims, why? The victims know the truth, we know who are in the files and now so do you. Do you really think the public is that ignorant of the truth? Further redacting the names, like yours, will only cause the distraction you say you don't want, and the conspiracies that you in fact are stirring. So I will continue to stay silent and continue to hide from all the pain and suffering, out of fear of you and your wealthy powerful "friends". In the end we are the biggest voices of the truth and the truth always comes out in time. DOJ-OGR-00000759 Docket and file. SO ORDERED: Date: 08/04/25 Richard M. Berman, U.S.D.J. --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 69 Filed 11/06/20 Page 1 of 4 U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of New York The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007 November 6, 2020 BY ECF The Honorable Alison J. Nathan United States District Court Southern District of New York United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 Re: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) Dear Judge Nathan: The Government respectfully submits this letter to request an extension of the deadline for the production of a subset of the electronic discovery in the above-referenced case from November 9, 2020 to November 23, 2020. This extension is necessary solely to allow adequate time for an outside vendor to finalize the preparation of documents extracted from electronic devices seized from Jeffrey Epstein for production. Over the past two days, the Government has conferred with defense counsel, who indicated this morning that they would only consent to the extension on four conditions, detailed below. Although the Government agrees to meet two of the defense conditions, it will not agree to the other two, which have no connection to the delay in discovery and no basis in law. Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court grant the extension to produce electronic discovery to November 23, 2020. To date, the Government has produced more than 350,000 pages of discovery to the defense over the course of five productions, and the Government expects to make a sixth production by the existing November 9, 2020 deadline, as detailed below. However, the Government's outside vendor has advised the Government that it requires additional time to prepare a seventh and final production of electronic discovery. By way of background, that final production comes from electronic devices that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") seized from Jeffrey Epstein's residences in New York and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2019. Specifically, in July of 2019, the FBI conducted multiple searches of Epstein's residence in New York, and in August of 2019, the FBI searched Epstein's residence in the U.S. Virgin Islands. During both searches, the FBI seized dozens of electronic devices. Pursuant to court-authorized warrants, the FBI then initiated the months-long process of gaining access to and extracting data from those devices. In or about January of 2020, the FBI provided some, but not all, of the data from those devices to the Government. At the request of Epstein's estate, a filter team conducted a review of that subset of data for potentially privileged materials. In or about February of 2020, the privilege team completed its review of a subset of data that the FBI had provided. In or about late February of 2020, the Government initiated a responsiveness review of that subset of data. On June 26, 2020, the Government obtained a new warrant expanding the scope of the DOJ-OGR-00001818 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page1 of 15 20-3061 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee, —against— GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant-Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN) Ms. Maxwell’s Response to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal Ty Gee Adam Mueller HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Tel. 303.831.7364 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell DOJ-OGR-00019592 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 69 Filed 08/04/25 Page 2 of 2 August 4, 2025 Page 2 Dear Judge Berman, in making your decision to allow the Unites States of America's current sitting attorneys for the DOJ's request to release these files, I ask you to have our attorneys review the "suggested" redactions as they are the ones who also know the victims, their names, their truths and their stories unlike the Unites States Government who did not and does not even care to know our truth. They would rather ask a convicted imprisoned sex trafficker/abuser for information. In conclusion, I beg the court to make sure it is the upmost priority that in any sort of release ALL and EVERY detail that could possibly reveal our identities be redacted. I also request that you take your time in making your decision and consider allowing for the victims attorney's to review these files before a release is permitted. Side Note: If other victims do not mind having their personal information redacted, my voice is not for them. Sincerely and thank you for your time, Xxx-victim/survivor DOJ-OGR-00000760 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 69 Filed 11/06/20 Page 2 of 4 Page 2 search of 62 of the electronic devices seized from Epstein. After the issuance of that new warrant, the Government requested that the FBI re-produce the data from all 62 devices because the FBI's prior production had only included a subset of the seized data and had not identified which file came from which seized device. On or about August 3, 2020, the FBI finished providing the Government all of the documents from the seized devices, this time organized by device. Because this production included data that the filter team had not previously reviewed, the Government's filter team conducted a full privilege review on this entire set of data. On October 7, 2020, the filter team completed its privilege review of that data and released to the case team the non-privileged documents for responsiveness review. The Government completed its responsiveness review on October 21, 2020, having identified approximately 1.2 million documents as responsive to the either the original or the expanded warrant. That same night, the Government requested that its outside vendor image, bates stamp, and download all of the responsive documents for production to the defense. Although the Government believed at the time that it had left its outside vendor, which the Government has repeatedly informed of the November 9, 2020 discovery deadline in this case, sufficient time to complete the process of stamping and downloading these materials for production, unfortunately, despite the vendor's best efforts, it does not appear the vendor will be able to complete that process by November 9. In particular, on November 4, 2020, the vendor informed the Government that although it has finished imaging the responsive documents, it does not expect to finish bates stamping the responsive documents and loading them onto an external hard drive until November 19, 2020. The vendor will then send that drive to the Government. Once the Government receives the drive, it will need a short amount of time to spot check the production and confirm it can be sent to the defense. Given these estimates from the vendor, it will not be technologically possible to produce these responsive documents by the November 9, 2020 deadline. Accordingly, on November 4, 2020, the Government contracted defense counsel to confer regarding an extension of the discovery deadline solely for this production. After conferring, the parties have been unable to reach agreement on an extension. This morning, the defense indicated that they would consent to an extension of the deadline for this production to November 23, 2020 on four conditions. First, the defense asked that the motion deadlines in this case be extended by three weeks. The Government agrees with that proposal and accordingly requests that defense motions be due on January 11, 2021, Government responses be due on February 12, 2021, and defense replies be due on February 19, 2021. Second, the defense asked that the Government provide a laptop for the defendant to use to review her discovery inside the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") by November 23, 2020. The Government has already purchased a laptop for such a purpose, and the MDC has agreed to allow the defendant use that laptop for discovery review once the Government's IT department has disabled all wireless and communications capabilities on the laptop. Accordingly, the Government agrees to meet this condition. Third, the defense asked that the Government provide it with the names of the three Minor Victims listed in the Indictment by November 23, 2020, and fourth, the defense asked that the Government provide the defense with all Jencks Act material by November 23, 2020. The Government cannot agree to the final two conditions set out by the defense, which have no connection to the two-week delay in completion of discovery and no basis in law. The DOJ-OGR-00001819 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page2 of 15 Background This appeal challenges the district court's order denying Ms. Maxwell's motion to modify the protective order. Ms. Maxwell's limited request sought permission from Judge Nathan to share certain information with another Article III judge. The government contends this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Judge Nathan's order. But if the government is right, then Judge Nathan's order is unreviewable. The collateral order doctrine is not so rigid. While an interlocutory appeal is the exception and not the rule, all the conditions required to satisfy the collateral order doctrine exist here. First, Judge Nathan's order conclusively determined the disputed question (whether Ms. Maxwell could share relevant and material information with another Article III judge). Second, Judge Nathan's order resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action (whether it is proper for one Article III judge, at the request of the government, to keep secret from a co-equal judge information relevant and material to the second judge's role in deciding a matter before her). And third, Judge Nathan's order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment (by the time of a final judgment, Judge Preska's order unsealing the deposition material will have gone into effect and Judge Preska will have ruled on 1 DOJ-OGR-00019593 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 69 Filed 11/06/20 Page 3 of 4 Page 3 first two conditions are reasonably related to the delayed production. The three-week extension of the defense's deadline to file motions will ensure the defense has adequate time to review discovery before finalizing its motions and is therefore rationally related to the two-week delay in this production. Similarly, the requested laptop will expedite and streamline the defendant's review of discovery by avoiding technological delays on the MDC computer system that may otherwise slow the defendant's discovery review. By contrast, a two-week delay in the completion of discovery, caused by technical constraints on the part of an outside vendor, has no bearing on the defense's entitlement to a witness list or witness statements. This Court has already ruled that such a request is premature when the "parties have not yet engaged in discussions regarding an appropriate schedule for pretrial disclosures, including witness lists and § 3500 material." (Dkt. 49 at 1). The Court accordingly ordered that the parties "meet and confer on an appropriate schedule" "[f]ollowing the close of discovery." (Id. at 2). Consistent with that order, the Government is prepared to engage in good faith discussions with the defense about an appropriate schedule for disclosure of Jencks Act and Giglio material. The standard practice in this District is to produce such material shortly in advance of trial, a practice that has been widely held to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Giglio be produced "in sufficient time that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to act upon the information efficaciously." United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007). Immediate disclosure of such material is not warranted simply because the defendant prefers it. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (denying defendant's motion for immediate disclosure of Giglio material as defendant "fails to articulate any persuasive reason why immediate disclosure is required in this case, and the Court otherwise sees no basis to deviate so substantially from the typical practice"); United States v. Thompson, 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material); United States v. Davis, No. 06 Cr. 911 (LBS), 2009 WL 637164, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 2009) ("The Second Circuit has held that a request for immediate or early disclosure [of Giglio material] has no basis in the law."). Because the Government's two-week delay in completing discovery does not entitle the defense to such materials more than seven months in advance of trial, the Government respectfully requests that the Court extend the deadline for this production to November 23, 2020 solely on the first two conditions set out by the defense. Other than these responsive documents from Epstein's electronic devices, the Government expects to complete its production of Rule 16 discovery to the defense by the November 9, 2020 deadline. In that vein, the Government is currently preparing its sixth discovery production to the defense, which will include, among other things, thousands of images and videos from Epstein's electronic devices identified as responsive to the expanded warrant, portions of iPads and an iPhone seized from Epstein identified as responsive to the expanded warrant, the four emails quoted in the Government's application for an expanded warrant, and documents from the FBI's Florida files. The Government expects to make that sixth production to the defense on November 9, 2020. Moreover, while the Government appreciates that the volume of materials it proposes to produce after the deadline is large, the Government has no reason to believe these materials will be central to any motion the defendant may seek to make. In particular, as noted above, all of DOJ-OGR-00001820 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page3 of 15 other unsealing requests and Ms. Maxwell's intended motion to stay the unsealing process, all without the benefit of knowing information relevant to those decisions). Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction here adheres to the purposes of the collateral order doctrine. The validity of the order can be assessed now without waiting until the trial is complete, and nothing about this appeal delays the criminal case. Alternatively, for the reasons given below, this Court can exercise mandamus jurisdiction to correct the district court's clear abuse of discretion. Argument I. This Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. This Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review a district court decision declining to modify the protective order. Pichler v. UNITE, 585 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the denial of the motion to modify the Protective Order and the denial of the motion to reconsider.”); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to modify protective order is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949)); see also Brown v. 2 DOJ-OGR-00019594 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 69 Filed 11/06/20 Page 4 of 4 Page 4 these materials come from devices seized from Epstein's residences, and none of the devices is believed to have belonged to the defendant. Further, of the approximately 1.2 million documents to be produced, only a handful were specifically relied upon by the Government in the investigation that led to the charges in the current Indictment,1 and the Government intends to produce those documents on November 9 with the rest of the sixth production. Additionally, as a result of the work being completed by the vendor, these materials will be produced to the defense in a manner that is readily sortable and searchable which should facilitate and expedite its review. The Government therefore respectfully requests that the Court extend the deadline for production of documents being prepared by an outside vendor to November 23, 2020, and that the Court similarly extend the motions schedule in this case by three weeks as requested by the defense. Respectfully submitted, AUDREY STRAUSS Acting United States Attorney By: Maurene Comey / Alison Moe / Lara Pomerantz Assistant United States Attorneys Southern District of New York Tel: (212) 637-2324 Cc: All Counsel of Record (By ECF) 1 In particular, the application in support of the July 2020 warrant included quotations from four emails extracted from the devices, and, as noted, the Government will produce all four of those documents to the defense by November 9, 2020. DOJ-OGR-00001821 --- PAGE BREAK --- Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2019) (appeal by intervenors challenging denial of motions to modify protective order and unseal). Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is immediately appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). The district court's order declining to modify the protective order meets all three requirements: the court conclusively decided not to modify the protective order, App. 99-103; the propriety of modifying the protective order is completely separate from the merits of the government's criminal allegations against Ms. Maxwell; and appellate review of the order will be impossible following final judgment because a post-judgment appeal will be moot since, by that time, Judge Preska's decision unsealing the deposition material in Giuffre v. Maxwell, Nos. 20-2413 (2d Cir.)/15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.) will have gone into effect. That is the very point of this appeal, after all: to share with Judge Preska the critical new information Ms. Maxwell has learned before it's too late. All --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page5 of 15 Ms. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts with another Article III judge. The government argues there is no jurisdiction for this Court to consider this appeal. Doc. 37. Quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, the government says the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted "with the utmost strictness in criminal cases." 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Doc. 37 at 8. According to the government, in criminal cases the doctrine applies only to orders denying a bond, orders denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy ground, orders denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech and Debate Clause, and orders permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial. Doc. 37 at 9. The government is wrong. To be sure, this appeal does not concern one of the four types of orders identified by the government. But that doesn't mean the appeal isn't proper under the collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it satisfies each of the doctrine's three requirements: Judge Nathan's order (1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349. 4 DOJ-OGR-00019596 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page6 of 15 In Flanagan v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that an order disqualifying criminal counsel pretrial was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984). The Court explained that unlike an order denying a motion to reduce bail, which “becomes moot if review awaits conviction and sentence,” an order disqualifying counsel is fully remediable posttrial. Id. Moreover, a motion to disqualify counsel is “not independent of the issues to be tried” because its “validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is complete.” Id. at 268. Finally, unlike an appeal of a bail decision, “an appeal of a disqualification order interrupts the trial,” and any delay in a criminal case “exacts a presumptively prohibitive price.” Id. at 269. Unlike the disqualification order at issue in Flanagan, the appeal of Judge Nathan’s order is like the appeal of an order denying a motion to reduce bail. First, this appeal will “become[] moot if review awaits conviction and sentence.” See id. at 266. Unless Ms. Maxwell can share with Judge Preska what she learned from Judge Nathan, Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition material will go into effect without Judge Preska’s getting the chance to reconsider her decision in light of the new information. And once the deposition material is unsealed, the cat is irretrievably out of the bag. That is precisely why this Court stayed Judge Preska’s order pending appeal. Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), Doc. 30. 5 DOJ-OGR-00019597 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page7 of 15 Second, the appeal of Judge Nathan's order is entirely "independent of the issues to be tried" in the criminal case and its "validity can" be adequately reviewed" now. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268. There is nothing about Ms. Maxwell's request to share information with Judge Preska that must wait until the criminal trial is over. To the contrary, waiting until the criminal trial is over will moot the issue. Third, this appeal does not and will not delay the criminal case, which is proceeding apace despite the proceedings before this Court. See id. at 264 (explaining that interlocutory appeals in criminal cases are generally disfavored because of the "societal interest in providing a speedy trial").1 The government's contentions to the contrary rely on two easily distinguishable cases and misunderstand Ms. Maxwell's arguments on the merits. Start with the two cases on which the government relies. Doc. 37, p 11 (citing United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996)). According to the government, Caparros and Pappas hold that "protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by 1 That the criminal case is proceeding on course despite this appeal confirms that this appeal involves an issue completely separate from the merits of the criminal action. 6 DOJ-OGR-00019598 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page8 of 15 the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal." Doc. 37, p 11. That is not correct. In Caparros, this Court dismissed an appeal of a protective order issued in a criminal case preventing the defendant from making public certain documents allegedly concerning public safety. 800 F.2d at 23-24. According to the defendant, the prohibition on public disclosure was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech. Id. at 24. This Court dismissed the appeal because it did not satisfy the three conditions precedent to interlocutory review, in particular the requirement that the issue must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 24–26. Said the Court: [The issue] will not become moot on conviction and sentence or on acquittal because the order will have continuing prohibitive effect thereafter and the purported right to publish the documents, to the extent it now exists, will also continue. This is not a situation where an order, to be reviewed at all, must be reviewed before the proceedings terminate. Nor is there any allegation of grave harm to appellant if the order is not immediately reviewed. Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted). This case is not like Caparros. For one thing, Ms. Maxwell does not seek to make anything public. To the contrary, she seeks to provide documents to judicial officers—under seal—to ensure that all the Article III decisionmakers are on the same page about the relevant facts and that Judge Preska does not continue to 7 DOJ-OGR-00019599 --- PAGE BREAK --- remain in the dark. For another thing, this appeal will become moot if review awaits a final judgment in the criminal case, even if the protective order continues to have prohibitive effect following the criminal trial. That's because what Ms. Maxwell seeks is permission to share information with Judge Preska now, information that should be part of Judge Preska's decisionmaking in the unsealing process and any decision whether to stay that process. And unless Ms. Maxwell can share the information now, the request will become moot because there is no way to "re-seal" a document Judge Preska prematurely unseals without the benefit of knowing all the facts. Pappas also doesn't help the government. In Pappas, this Court dismissed in part an appeal challenging a protective order prohibiting the defendant from disclosing classified information he obtained from the government as part of discovery. 94 F.3d at 797. At the same time, the Court accepted jurisdiction over the portion of the appeal that challenged the protective order's bar on disclosure of information the defendant acquired from the government before the litigation. Id. at 798. This Court distinguished the differing results based on the breadth of the protective order's ban. Id. As this Court said, "to the extent that the order prohibits Pappas from disclosure of information he acquired from the Government prior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating 8 DOJ-OGR-00019600 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page10 of 15 discovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its restraint." Id. (citing United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1993)). Beyond standing for the proposition that interlocutory appeals are the exception and not the rule (which Ms. Maxwell doesn't dispute), Pappas has nothing to add to the analysis here. Even strictly construing the three requirements for collateral order jurisdiction, see Will, 546 U.S. at 349, the order here meets the test. The balance of the government's argument against jurisdiction misunderstands Ms. Maxwell's position. For example, according to the government, "it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in this appeal have been finally resolved." Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell's argument, says the government, is "primarily focused on attacking the legitimacy of the Government's methods of obtaining evidence that it intends to use to prosecute the criminal case through the Subpoenas to" the recipient. Doc. 37, p 17. Based on this understanding, the government claims that Ms. Maxwell "seeks to have this Court reach the merits of her arguments on that issue in the context of the civil appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by the --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page11 of 15 District Court in the criminal case." Doc. 37, p 17 (emphasis in original). That is not so. In the civil appeal, Ms. Maxwell is not asking this Court to rule on the propriety of the government's conduct in circumventing Martindell. Rather, Ms. Maxwell's argument in the civil appeal is that, unless this Court reverses Judge Preska's order unsealing the deposition material, Ms. Maxwell may never be able to challenge before Judge Nathan the government's conduct in obtaining her depositions. As Ms. Maxwell said in her opening brief in the appeal of Judge Preska's unsealing order: The civil case is not the appropriate forum to litigate the government's apparent violation of Martindell. Ms. Maxwell intends to make that argument to Judge Nathan in the criminal case. But if Judge Preska's unsealing order is affirmed and Ms. Maxwell's deposition is released, her ability to make that argument before Judge Nathan will be prejudiced. Keeping the deposition material sealed will preserve the status quo and protect Ms. Maxwell's right to litigate Martindell and the Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding. Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413, ECF Dkt. 69, p 33. Only by mischaracterizing Ms. Maxwell's argument can the government contend that she "seeks to have this Court reach the merits of her arguments on [the Martindell] issue in the context of the civil appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by the District Court in the criminal case." See Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell's point 10 DOJ-OGR-00019602 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page12 of 15 is that, unless the unsealing order is reversed, she likely won't be able to "properly litigate" the Martindell issue at all. Nor is this appeal the proper forum for deciding whether the government improperly circumvented Martindell. All Ms. Maxwell seeks here is an order allowing her to share with Judge Preska information that is essential to her decision to unseal the deposition material and to rule on a motion to stay, information Judge Preska did not know at the time and information the government insists should be kept from her. And that issue—whether it is proper for one Article III judge, at the request of the government, to keep secret from a co-equal judge information relevant and material to the second judge's role in deciding a matter before her—is properly reviewed on an interlocutory basis because it is "an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action." Will, 546 U.S. at 349. II. Alternatively, this Court can exercise mandamus jurisdiction. Assuming Ms. Maxwell cannot appeal Judge Nathan's order under the collateral order doctrine, this Court should exercise mandamus jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to modify the protective order as requested by Ms. Maxwell. E.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1980) (declining to decide whether the collateral order applied and instead issuing a writ of mandamus to vacate a district court decision declining to modify 11 DOJ-OGR-00019603 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page13 of 15 protective order), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1068 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009); see Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (recognizing that protective orders in criminal cases "[i]n rare instances . . . might raise issues available for review via a petition for writ of mandamus"). A writ of mandamus issued under the All Writs Act "confine[s] the court against which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction." In re City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). A writ is properly issued when "exceptional circumstances amount[] to a . . . clear abuse of discretion." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Three conditions must exist for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus: (1) the petitioner must demonstrate the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable; (2) she must have no other adequate means to attain the relief desired; and (3) the issuing court must be satisfied the writ is appropriate. In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., 745 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014). All three conditions exist here. First, as explained in her opening brief, Judge Nathan clearly abused her discretion in declining to modify the protective order. Doc. 60, pp 23-33. Second, Ms. Maxwell has no other adequate means to attain the relief necessary because her request for Judge Preska to reevaluate her unsealing order 12 DOJ-OGR-00019604 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page14 of 15 with the benefit of knowing what everyone else knows will become moot once the deposition material is unsealed (as this Court already recognized by staying the unsealing order pending appeal). Finally, it is appropriate for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus because, as explained in Ms. Maxwell's motion to consolidate, the judges in the Southern District of New York have reached inconsistent decisions to prejudice of Ms. Maxwell. A writ of mandamus is appropriate because only this Court can guarantee that all the judges below are on the same page. Conclusion For these reasons, as well as those given in the opening brief, Doc. 60, pp 10-22, this Court should deny the government's motion to dismiss the appeal. September 28, 2020. 13 DOJ-OGR-00019605 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page15 of 15 Respectfully submitted, s/ Adam Mueller Ty Gee Adam Mueller HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Tel 303.831.7364 Fax 303.832.2628 tgee@hmflaw.com amueller@hmflaw.com Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell Certificate of Compliance Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g) and Rule 27(d)(2)(A), the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this response complies with the type-volume limitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word processing system used to prepare this response, there are 2,842 words in this response. s/ Adam Mueller Certificate of Service I certify that on September 28, 2020, I filed this Ms. Maxwell's Response to the Government's Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court via CM/ECF, which will send notification of the filing to all counsel of record. I also certify that I emailed a copy of this motion to all counsel of record. s/ Nicole Simmons 14 DOJ-OGR-00019606