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defendant's prima facie case by showing a "significant state interest" behind the jury selection process at issue.
II. Fifth Amendment
The Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment similarly forbids the exclusion of racial minorities from grand and petit juries.3 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492 (1977).
To raise a plausible equal protection challenge against a jury selection system, the defendant must show (1) a cognizable group; (2) that is substantially underrepresented; and (3) that the selection procedure is not racially neutral. Alston, 791 F.2d at 257. Although this three-part test resembles the Sixth Amendment framework, there is a critical difference: in contradistinction to a fair cross-section challenge brought under the Sixth Amendment, an equal protection claim must allege intentional discrimination by the jury selection system at issue. See id. ("The equal protection clause . . . condemns underrepresentation of minorities only if it is the product of intentional discrimination."); see also United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 659 (2d Cir. 1996).
III. The JSSA
Finally, the JSSA sets forth the Nation's policy that: "all litigants in Federal court entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes." 28 U.S.C. § 1861. The Second Circuit has held that fair cross-section challenges brought under the JSSA must also be analyzed using the Sixth Amendment's Duren test. See United States v. LaChance, 788 F.2d 856, 864 (2d Cir. 1986). Thus, if a fair cross-section challenge fails under the Sixth Amendment, it also fails under the JSSA. See id. ("[B]ecause the Duren test governs fair cross
3 The Supreme Court has incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause into the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
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