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Document DOJ-OGR-00021857

AI Analysis

Summary: The document discusses the court's decision regarding the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) between Epstein and the USAO-SDNY, concluding that it did not bar Maxwell's prosecution. The court applied the Annabi precedent to determine the NPA's scope, finding it limited to the Southern District of Florida. The decision is significant in understanding the jurisdictional reach of NPAs.
Significance: This document is potentially important because it establishes the court's interpretation of the NPA's jurisdictional scope and its application to the defendant's prosecution.
Key Topics: Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) interpretation Jurisdictional scope of NPA Application of United States v. Annabi precedent
Key People:
  • Maxwell - defendant in the case
  • Epstein - individual involved in the Non-Prosecution Agreement
  • Annabi - relevant case law precedent
Document Type
Court Filing
Date
Unknown
Pages
1
Folder
IMAGES008

Full Text

contemplates a broader restriction."11 And while Maxwell contends that we cannot apply Annabi to an agreement negotiated and executed outside of this Circuit, we have previously done just that.12 Applying Annabi, we conclude that the NPA did not bar Maxwell's prosecution by USAO-SDNY. There is nothing in the NPA that affirmatively shows that the NPA was intended to bind multiple districts. Instead, where the NPA is not silent, the agreement's scope is expressly limited to the Southern District of Florida. The NPA makes clear that if Epstein fulfilled his obligations, he would no longer face charges in that district: After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any 11 United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). We recognize that circuits have been split on this issue for decades. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002). 12 See, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (applying Annabi to plea agreement entered into in the District of New Jersey); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order) (same, to agreement entered into in the District of New Mexico). Nor does Annabi, as Maxwell contends, apply only where subsequent charges are "sufficiently distinct" from charges covered by an earlier agreement. In Annabi, this Court rejected an interpretation of a prior plea agreement that rested on the Double Jeopardy Clause, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause applied, the subsequent charges were "sufficiently distinct" and therefore fell outside the Clause's protections. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. This Court did not, however, conclude that the rule of construction it announced depended on the similarities between earlier and subsequent charges. 10 DOJ-OGR-00021857